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Abstract—Cloud computing system based on data centers
has recently attracted considerable attention. In that system,
all data are communicated via a high speed optical network
between a customer and data center or between data cen-
ters. There is a serious threat so called “Eavesdropper data
center business”, which means the eavesdropper can get all
data from the transmission line and sell specific data selected
by the protocol analyzer to malicious people who want to get
the secret data. So we need to consider cyber attack against
Layer-1 (physical layer). Quantum cryptography has been
developed to protect such an attack. In order to apply such a
new security technologies, the communication performance
is very important as well as its security, because the data
speed is more than several Gbit/sec. This research note
III will discuss communication performances of quantum
key distribution (QKD) and quantum enigma cipher, and
explaines that QKD based on single photon signals cannot
realize appropriate data speed, but quantum enigma cipher
can .
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been claimed by many research institutes
that quantum key distribution allows two remote
users to generate a secure random key for practical
networks. However, in reality, this is not true, because
communication performance of QKD is extremely poor.
The reason is that they have to employ single photon
or very weak light as the transmission signal. QKD
researchers would like to simultaneously reach long
distances and high rates, but it is impossible by the
law of physics. In order to avoid this problem, they
employed a theory of a rate-loss tradeoff in which they
restrict the meaning of “rate” as the term. That is, their
rate means bit per pulse or mode, not bit per sec that
is the most essential for communication performance.
In general, such an unit has to be discussed under the
non vanishing situation of signals in the communication
process. Let us describe a confusion in the following:
⌈To achieve QKD with high rates is demanded if
we compete with the the conventional infrastructure for
fiber based classical communication where the general
IT network sets rate as high as several Gbit/sec for
distance up to several hundred km. So there has been
an effort towards high-rate QKD.⌋
Team of “high rate” in the above QKD and Gbit/sec
of fiber link has no relation in this case. QKD by single
photon signal cannot realize a secure communication
for Gbit/sec as data. Despite the fact, QKD group uses
ambiguous term. An example of the typical trick is a
paper entitled “Quantum secured gigabit optical access
networks)[1] by A.Shields et al (Toshiba group).” It is
clear that there is a mismatch between title and contents.
Recently MIT groups have pointed out that such a
description on QKD is not fair. They clearly describe
the communication performance as follows [2,3,4]:
⌈QKD would enable full IT security by means of
one time pad, but its secret key rate has to equal to
the desired communication rate (bit/sec). Unfortunately
demonstrated key rates fall far short of what is needed
for widespread use of one time pad. At present,
therefore, QKD’s principal application is to rekey
classical cryptosystems, making overall security that of
the classical system. In fact, numerous QKD protocols
have demonstrated robust extraction of secret key over
200 km with key rates up to the order of 10 bit/sec.⌋
As general users pointed out many times, when we
consider secure communication systems, we have to
take into account the following requirements on the
encryption system to protect the data of gigabit per sec:
Requirement of specifications:
(1) Data-speed:1 Gbit/sec ∼ 100 Gbit/sec
(2) Distance: 1000 km ∼ 10000 km
(3) Encryption scheme: Symmetric Key Cipher
(4) Security: Provable security, Secure against Brute
force attack (exhaustive search trial for secret key) by
means of computer and also physical devices.
In this note, we will reaffirm that QKD cannot
provide such performance, but quantum enigma cipher
[5] can.
II. BASIS OF COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE
A. Single photon communication
Let us describe the energy loss channel for photon
number. The input-output relation for the photon channel
of transmissivity κ is given as follows:
P (n|k) = nCk(κ)
k(1− κ)n−k (1)
where n and k are photon number at input and output,
respectively. For the single photon signal, the arrival
probability of the photon at the channel output is
P (k = 1) = κ (2)
Thus, the rate of speed becomes
RS = κ (3)
The loss property of an optical fiber with low loss is
0.2 dB/km for the wavelength 1.55 µm. This means κ =
0.01 for the fiber length 100km. Before we start QKD
protocol, the rate of the channel is already κ = 0.01.
So, when the input rate of this channel is 1 Gbit/sec, the
output rate is 10 Mbit/sec.
B. Coherent state communication
Let us consider the transmission of coherent state
signal. There is an important theorem as follows:
Theorem [6]: Only coherent state can maintain the
pure state property against energy loss channel.
Thus, the arrival probability of signal itself is
P (pulse) = 1− | < 0|α >out |
2 = 1− e−κ|α|
2 (4)
∼ 1 κ|α|2 >> 1 (5)
where |α >out is the coherent state at the output of
the channel, and α is the input amplitude of coherent
state signal. In the conventional optical communications,
|α|2 = 106 at 1 Gbit/sec. Thus, when the input rate is 1
Gbit/sec, the output is also 1 Gbit/sec.
C. PPM communication
The pulse position modulation (PPM) is one of mod-
ulation schemes in communication systems. A typical
structure used in quantum optical communication is
|Ψi >= |0 >1 |0 >2 . . . |α >i |0 >i+1 . . . |0 >N (6)
where i and N mean ith signal and slot length, respec-
tively. That is, the information i as the data corresponds to
the position of the coherent state with non zero amplitude.
The total energy per symbol is < n >= |α|2. So, the
energy per pulse becomes |α|2/N . Thus, one symbol in
this scheme can convey log2N bits under the low average
energy. The arrival probability of symbol is
P (symbol) = 1− | < 0|α >out |
2 = 1− e−κ|α|
2 (7)
It looks very efficient in the sense of the energy constraint
when we use N >> 1. However, it is not efficient in
the sense of frequency bandwidth, because this requires
N times of the bandwidth of the conventional commu-
nication systems. So far, many ideas have published to
improve the bandwidth explosion, keeping a good energy
efficiency. The most famous method is to employ Reed-
Solomon code. Even though such coding theories can
improve the bandwidth problem, still there are many
serious inefficiencies in the total performance of com-
munications.
III. COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE OF QKD
BASED ON SINGLE PHOTON OR WEAK LIGHT
A. Rate theory of QKD
The rate theory is one of the most important subjects
in the theoretical QKD. So far, the theoretical analysis of
rate for QKD has been dealt with the unit of bit per pulse
or mode. Recently, the incomplete bound [7] of the rate
has been replaced by the rigorous and beautiful analysis
[8] as follows:
R = log
1
1− κ
∼ 1.44κ bit/pulse (8)
Since the pulse (photon signal) disappears with probabil-
ity κ, the real rate (efficiency) for the practical use in the
real fiber channel is
RE = RS ×R ∼ 1.44κ
2 (9)
This means that when the input rate is 1 Gbit/sec, the
output under the ultimate efficiency is
(i) 100 Kbit/sec for 100 km,
(ii) 10 bit/sec for 200 km.
This fact supports the comment of MIT paper [2-
4] refered in the introduction of this paper. Thus, QKD
has a serious defect in the sense of communication
performance. To date, nobody is interested in such
an inefficient communication system. Thus, the author
cannot understand how the QKD system can provide
the security for “gigabit access network [1]”. The real
situation is that QKD experiment has been demonstrated
in the conventional fiber transmission system of gigabit
data communication. Thus their title is misleading.
In fact, the headquarter of Toshiba believed that real
gigabits data has been encrypted by quantum system.
B. Cryptosystem based on QKD
(1) AES+QKD
It is clear that the QKD is the most inefficient
scheme in modern communication systems, so we
have to use the QKD for providing the secret key of
a mathematical encryption such as AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard). AES has in general the secret key
of 256 bits. QKD can provide 256 bits with the delay
time of 26 seconds, because the bit rate is 10 bits/sec
when the communication distance is 200 km. Thus we
need 26 seconds for one round of refresh key. AES
operating at 1 Gbit/sec sends 26 Gbits during each 26
seconds based on the previous key. The eavesdropper
can get the correct ciphertext of 26 Gbits from the
transmission line. This is sufficient to launch the crypto-
analysis. In addition, AES can be decrypted by the Brute
force attack under the correct cipher text and plaintext
of 256 bits. This means that the plaintext (data) of 26
Gbits -256 bits can be decrypted by only 256 bits, in
principle.
(2) One time pad
Let us examine the one time pad system. We assume
that
(i) We want to encrypt 1 Gbits data.
(ii) Transmission systems can send 1 Gbits/sec
To encrypt 1 Gbits, we have to store the generated
key sequence of 1 Gbits in the Hard-Disk by spending
108 seconds (3 years). Then 1 Gbits is sent at 1 second.
Again we have to wait 108 seconds (3 years) to send the
next 1 Gbits.
IV. COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE OF QUANTUM
ENIGMA CIPHER
A. Rate of quantum enigma cipher by coherent state
As discussed in the previous section, the signal does
not disappear in the coherent state communication with
large energy like typical classical communication system.
Since the quantum enigma cipher (QEC) can employ such
large energy as the transmission signal, the rate of speed
is
RS ∼ 1 (10)
So, in general, the speed at input of the channel can be
kept at the output. This performance is very important
to apply physical cipher to the real network. To derive
the real rate of quantum enigma cipher in such cases,
we will need the information theoretical rate theory.
It depends on noise, modulation scheme, error correct-
ing code, scheme of mathematical encryption box, and
randomization scheme. However, IEEE standard for the
optical network requires error free in point to point link,
for example,
Pe(Bob) ∼ 10
−9 (11)
with no time delay. It means that the real application
of physical cipher to IEEE standard link requires the
following rate:
RE = 1 (12)
The quantum enigma cipher will satisfy the requirements
described in the introduction of this paper and the above
requirement. So,
RE(QEC) ∼ 1 (13)
though it depends on the implimentation method.
B. Cryptosystem by quantum enigma cipher
The quantum enigma cipher consists of an integration
of mathematical encryption box and physical randomiza-
tion for ciphertext of mathematical encryption box [5].
The mathematical encryption box has a secret key of the
length |Ks| bits and PRNG for expansion of the secret
key. The physical encryption box has a mechanism to
create ciphertext as signal and it has a function to induces
an error when the eavesdropper receives the ciphertext as
signal. Consequently the different ciphertext sequences
are observed in the legitimate’s receiver and the eaves-
dropper’s receiver, respectively. The quantum mechanics
plays a fundamental role to create the following situation.
Pe(Eve) >> Pe(Bob or Alice) ∼ 10
−9 (14)
There are many implementation methods to realize
quantum enigma cipher. The communication perfor-
mances may especially depend on the structures of both
mathematical encryption box and physical randomization.
But since we can employ a high power coherent state
signals for the quantum enigma cipher, we have no signal
arrival probability problem. In addition, it may have error
free communication. As a result, in general the quantum
enigma cipher does not degrade any input rate. Thus,
we can simply replace the tranceiver in the conventional
optical communication infrastructure (fiber or space) by
the quantum enigma cipher tranceiver. This is also very
important in the real world network.
Let us denote some examples. Schemes [9,10] based
on difference of quantum detection performance and
quantum illumination [11,3] do not degrade the rate,
because the rate is kept in the physical randomization
in the such simplest cascade schemes.
However, a scheme by PPM signal structure may have
a tradeoff for security-rate [12]. In the case of quantum
noise randomized stream cipher α/η[13,14] or Y-00
[15,16] , basically the rate is not degraded through the
encryption process. However, when the masking effect to
randomize the ciphertext is very small in the real setting,
we have to employ additional randomization methods or a
new technique. Although well known randomizations [17]
[18] do not degrade the input rate, some methods such as
deliberate randomization in the data stream may degrade
it. In this case, we have to design the randomization
carefully.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has introduced the communication perfor-
mance of QKD and quantum enigma cipher which is es-
sential for application of all quantum cryptography to the
real world. Consequently, it has been explained that the
communication performance of QKD by single photon
has no prospect. This fact had been confirmed already in
2003 by several governments. However, the development
of such QKDs was tolerated by such governments under
the several reasons. Now time has come to change the
direction of the development of a quantum cryptography
with a new concept, because the ciber attack against
physical layer of networks become a real possibility at
present.
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